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I. INTRODUCTION
In its recent decision of Theobald v. University of Cincinnati, Ohio’s Tenth
District Court of Appeals declared that medical practitioners shall have state
employee immunity, based on section 9.86 of the Ohio Revised Code, anytime they
treat a patient as long as they act in a dual role to “teach” an “involved” student or
resident.1 This immunity takes away the patient’s right to sue the practitioner
∗
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1

See Theobald v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 827 N.E.2d 365, 377 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005), aff’d,
857 N.E.2d 573 (Ohio 2006).
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personally for his medical malpractice. As required by this holding, the doctor must
have an employment relationship with a state medical college.2 However, the
employment relationship could encompass anything from a faculty position to
something as minimal as a work relationship with a private practice plan closely tied
to the state medical college.3
Also, within this holding, the court held that the amount of involvement of the
student or resident does not matter as long as the practitioner was “teaching” at the
time of treatment.4 Essentially, teaching may be satisfied as long as the student or
resident observes treatment.5 Finally, the court emphasized that the patient’s view of
his relationship with the practitioner is completely irrelevant during an immunity
determination.6 Thus, private patients will not be allowed to sue physicians in their
private capacity.
Theobald runs contrary to the established case law of Ohio at the time.7 The
prior law was clear that practitioners receive immunity when treating a patient of the
state or supervising another’s treatment of a patient.8 Moreover, when Theobald is
compared to other jurisdictions’ immunity grants, Ohio appears to be an extreme
outlier.9 And even when Ohio is compared to those states with nearly identical
immunity statutes, Theobald still does not meet conventional jurisprudence.10
Finally, not only is it difficult to justify the decision through precedent or
conventional wisdom among the several states, but there are also harsh practical
effects that make any policy justification unreasonable. First, a plaintiff’s primary
forum, in a Theobald-like case, has now been changed from the Court of Common
Pleas to the Court of Claims.11 Second, with the grant of immunity, the state shall be
liable for all damages, but statutory limitations allow much less recovery against the
state than against private medical practitioners.12 These limitations result from the
inflexibility of the cap on damages against the state, which does not provide for cap
2

Id. at 372.

3

Id. at 372-74. The nurse in this case was held to be an employee of the state since she
worked with a practice plan that contributed funds to the college of nursing and the dean of the
college had a certain extent of control over the funds.
4

Id. at 377.

5

Id. One can infer that the court intends teaching to include practicing medicine with a
student observing from its statement: “[s]tudents and residents then benefit from working with
these clinical faculty members, learning to practice medicine by observing and assisting them
in the treatment of patients.” Id. at 375. (emphasis added). One may also draw this inference
from the general tone of the opinion and the promotion of the University of Cincinnati’s
interest in educating students.
6

Id. at 377.

7

See infra Part III.

8

See id.

9

See infra Part IV.

10

See id.

11

See infra Part V.A.

12

See infra Part V.B.
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exceptions due to deformity, loss of limb, or loss of bodily organ system. Third,
Theobald gives state related practitioners less of an economic incentive to follow the
standard of care than it does to private physicians, consequently devaluing medical
service markets.13
Part II of this article discusses how the case of Theobald developed and how the
Tenth District came to its ultimate conclusion that dual agent medical practitioners
should receive immunity. Part III addresses Ohio’s prior case law leading up to the
Theobald decision. Part IV compares the Ohio immunity statute, section 9.86 of the
Ohio Revised Code and the Theobald outcome to similar statutes and restatements of
other states and their ultimate rules on dual agent immunity. Part V discusses the
practical effects of Theobald, including the change of forum, new limitation on
damages, and economic effects on the medical service market.
Theobald was upheld in law and fact by the Supreme Court of Ohio on December
13, 2006.14 However, since the Tenth District Court of Appeals has issued all the
pertinent case law on this matter, and the Supreme Court of Ohio simply affirmed the
reasoning, this article shall discuss the Court of Appeals’ decision and not the
Supreme Court’s.
II. THEOBALD V. UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI
A. Theobald’s Facts
Theobald began with a patient of the University of Cincinnati’s University
Hospital alleging inadequate medical care, which resulted in blindness and lack of
mobility in his arms.15 Mr. Theobald, a plaintiff and the victim in this case, arrived
at the hospital in serious condition after a multi-car collision.16 Soon after arrival,
the hospital staff identified his injuries and initially ascertained that surgery was
necessary.17
The practitioners, however, waited until the following day to perform more tests
to ensure surgery was, in fact, required.18 Due to Mr. Theobald’s extensive spinal
injury, surgery would be seriously complicated.19 The next day’s examinations and
x-rays confirmed that he would need an operation, and that evening the medical team
performed surgery.20 Three residents and a student assisted in or observed the
treatment administered to Mr. Theobald at some point during the two days.21 The

13

See infra Part V.C.

14

Theobald v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 857 N.E.2d 573 (Ohio 2006).

15

Theobald v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 827 N.E.2d 365, 368-70 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005), aff’d,
857 N.E.2d 573 (Ohio 2006).
16

Id. at 368-69.

17

Id. at 368.

18

Id.

19

Id.

20

Id.

21

Id. at 377.
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plaintiffs’ claim was that subsequent to the operation Mr. Theobald went blind and
lost all mobility of his arms.22
B. Theobald’s Posture
A year later, Mr. and Mrs. Theobald brought suit against the hospital and the four
key medical practitioners that performed his operation.23 The group of four
defendants included three doctors who worked for the University of Cincinnati
[hereinafter UC] part-time and one nurse who volunteered as a part-time clinical
instructor at the university.24 All four, however, also work professionally in private
practice plans,25 which paid them individually for Mr. Theobald’s treatment.26
Mr. and Mrs. Theobald filed suit in the Court of Claims against UC, a state
actor.27 The four medical practitioners were also joined in the suit since they
asserted immunity under section 9.86 of the Ohio Revised Code. This section of the
statute grants the employees and officers of the State of Ohio full immunity from
civil liability when acting within the scope of their employment, unless the officer or
employee acted with “malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless
manner.”28 Therefore, before granting immunity a court must decide “(1) that the
person is a state officer or employee, and (2) that the officer or employee was acting
within his scope of employment and without malicious purpose, in bad faith or in a
wanton or reckless manner.”29 Further, a court must assess whether the overriding
interests of another severs the scope of employment for one who would otherwise be
considered an employee of the state.30
Procedurally, anytime there is a question of whether a person should receive state
employee immunity under section 9.86, a plaintiff must proceed to the Court of
Claims, which hears claims against the State, for an immunity determination.31 If the
immunity is determined to be proper, the plaintiff’s only claim exists against the
state, which waives sovereign immunity for actions of state employees who receive

22

Id. at 368-69.

23

Id. at 369. No claim was brought against the students or residents.

24

Id. at 372-73.

25

Private practice plans or groups are companies formed by medical practitioners who are
contracted out to private patients rather than patients of the State.
26

Id. at 372-73.

27

Id. at 369. The Court of Claims is the proper court in Ohio to bring a suit against the

State.
28

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 9.86 (LexisNexis 2006).

29

Theobald, 827 N.E.2d at 372.

30

See Katko v. Balcerzak, 536 N.E.2d 10, 14 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) superseded on other
grounds by Lautner v. Russell, No. 1-90-99, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 4650 (Ohio Ct. App.
Sept. 24, 1991); Balson v. Ohio State Univ., 677 N.E.2d 1216, 1222 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
31

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(F) (LexisNexis 2006).
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section 9.86 immunity.32 If immunity does not exist, then the cause of action will
proceed to the Court of Common Pleas.33
Accordingly, the Court of Claims held an immunity determination of whether the
medical practitioners were employees of the state and acting in the scope of
employment of UC.34 In its decision, the Court of Claims ruled that only two of the
medical practitioners were employees of the state and none were within the scope of
state employment.35
After appeals on a separate issue, UC appealed the ruling of the Court of Claims
as to state employee status.36 The Tenth District Court of Appeals heard the appeal
and ultimately reversed the lower court’s decision.37 The Supreme Court of Ohio
heard a final appeal by the Theobalds but ultimately affirmed the appellate court’s
holding in both law and fact.38
C. Theobald’s Opinion and Holding
The Tenth District first considered whether the doctors and nurse qualified as
state employees. Since the Court of Claims held that two of the doctors met the
requirement for state employment, the Tenth District needed only to decide if the
third doctor and the nurse were state employees.39 The court concluded that the
doctor was a state employee since he had worked for the UC as an assistant
professor.40
The court focused much more on whether the nurse was a state employee,
because the nurse’s employment relationship with UC was only as a volunteer
clinical instructor.41 She received no compensation for her work from UC. Instead,
she was gainfully employed by a private practice plan which had a working
relationship with UC.42 Particularly, the private practice plan provided funds for
UC’s anesthesia department, and UC maintained checks on the practice plan’s
budgetary concerns.43 The court ultimately decided that the relationship between the
32

§ 2743.02(A)(1).

33

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.01 (LexisNexis 2006). Court of Common Pleas has
general jurisdiction for all cases where there is no immunity. Therefore, the Court of
Common Pleas retains jurisdiction over actions against an individual and not the State.
34

Theobald, 827 N.E.2d at 369. The suit against the medical professionals was filed in the
Court of Common Pleas, but the Court of Claims joined them for determination.
35

Id. at 369-70.

36

Id. at 370.

37

Id. at 378.

38

Theobald v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 857 N.E.2d 573 (Ohio 2006).

39

Theobald v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 827 N.E.2d 365, 369-70 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005), aff’d,
857 N.E.2d 573 (Ohio 2006).
40

Id. at 372-73.

41

Id. at 373.

42

Id.

43

Id.
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private employer and UC was “sufficiently close,” in spite of being separate legal
entities; thus, the nurse was considered a state employee for immunity purposes.44
Next, the court discussed the case’s main issue: whether the medical practitioners
acted within the scope of their employment during the surgery that led to the cause of
action. The court began by stating the general rule that "conduct is within the scope
of employment if it is initiated, in part, to further or promote the master's business."45
Thus, the court had to find enough state interest in the treatment of Mr. Theobald to
find immunity.46
The court analysis examined “scope of employment” by looking to the history of
the doctrine. It started with a traditional test that emphasized the “financial factor”
of the scope of employment.47 This financial factor places the medical practitioner in
the scope of employment of the party – practice plan or state entity – which collects
money from the patient and pays the medical practitioner.48 If the court only applied
financial factor testing in Theobald, all of the medical professionals involved would
be outside the scope of state employment since the private practice plans collected
fees from Mr. Theobald and paid them for the medical services rendered.49
The court’s discussion then moved on to the education factor, which developed
over the prior nine years as a counterpoint to the financial factor test. The education
factor maintains that a university, in this case UC, has an interest in students and
residents assisting in and observing a patient’s treatment because such involvement
creates a valuable learning experience that would not otherwise be available.50
Additionally, the state has an interest in educational funding, which is partially
provided by the private practice plans of medical practitioners.51 The court applied
the education earlier in the decision of employee status for the nurse, where the
funding of the medical school by the nurse’s practice plan and their intertwinement,
created an effective employment between the nurse and UC.52
After presenting these two opposing factors, the court then created new precedent
by effectively removing the financial factor from any analysis of “within the scope of
employment” for immunity purposes, leaving education as the only guiding factor.
The court stated:
[W]e conclude that although the financial factors may be relevant to
determine whether a practitioner is an employee of the state, the financial
factors generally have little bearing upon whether a practitioner is acting
44

Id.

45

Id. at 374. (citing Patena v. Univ. of Akron, No. 01AP-845, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS
1701, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2002)).
46

Id.

47

Id.

48

Id.

49

Id.

50

Id. at 375.

51

Id. These practice plans are related to the medical college and give it a share of the
proceeds from private medical procedures. Id.
52

See supra Part II.C.
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within the scope of his employment. . . . Because the state's interest is
promoted no matter how the education of the student or resident occurs, a
practitioner is acting within the scope of his employment if he educates a
student or resident by direct instruction, demonstration, supervision, or
simple involvement of the student or resident in the patient's care.53
Within this context, the court held a student’s or resident’s amount of involvement
does not matter as long as the practitioner was teaching at the time of treatment.54
Essentially, teaching may be satisfied as long as the student or resident observes
treatment.55 Finally, the court stated that in an immunity determination, the patient’s
view of his relationship with the practitioner is completely irrelevant.56
Thus, the appellate court overruled the Court of Claim, set new precedent, and
remanded the case for a determination of whether students or residents were
involved in each aspect of Mr. Theobald’s treatment so each defendant’s immunity
could be properly decided.57
III. HISTORY OF MEDICAL PRACTITIONER-STATE EMPLOYEE IMMUNITY CASE LAW
It is important to look at the history of physician immunity since a major reason
for the Theobald court’s holding was the continued progression to granting broader
immunity for these physicians. Also, it is important to keep in mind the question of
whether Theobald follows the continued “progress” or sharply changes the direction
of Ohio physician immunity law in terms of acting “within the scope” of
employment. Further, since the Tenth District is the appellate court to the Court of
Claims, it is the only court that has proper authority to review decisions of immunity.
And given that the Supreme Court of Ohio has yet to address the issue of physicianstate employee immunity in dual agency, the Tenth District has been the ultimate
authority on the matter.
The Tenth District cited Katko v. Balcerzak as the first case discussing the issue
of medical practitioner-state employee immunity due to involvement with a State of
Ohio-operated medical college.58 In Katko, a private patient’s estate brought a
malpractice suit against a physician who treated the decedent at the Ohio State
University Hospital.59 While the case did not specifically mention any teaching
during the treatment of the patient, teaching was part of the doctor’s job description
with the Ohio State University, and the court found the line between “when teaching
stops and patient care picks up” to be blurry at best.60 The court remanded the case
53

Theobald, 827 N.E.2d at 377 (emphasis added).

54

Id.

55

Id.

56

Id. at 378.

57

Id.

58

Katko v. Balcerzak, 536 N.E.2d 10, 14 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (Katko is the oldest case
that the author found discussing medical practitioner-state employee immunity due to
involvement with a State of Ohio-operated medical college.).
59

Id. at 11.

60

Id. at 14.
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for a factual determination as to whether the doctor in rendering services to a private
patient was acting as an individual physician or as an employee of the university.61
The court also discussed the fact that the Ohio State University did not receive any
payment from the services provided by the defendant physician, but the court never
expanded on the effect a receipt of funds by the university would have on the
outcome of the case.62
The next case on appeal to the Tenth District was Latham v. Ohio State
University Hospital.63 In Latham, the court considered whether an emergency room
attending physician could be considered an employee of the Ohio State University
Hospital, for state liability purposes, when he is contracted for hospital work through
a private corporation but also acts as an assistant clinical professor.64 The court
omitted any mention of teaching or instructing residents or students during treatment
of the decedent in the case. Instead, the court primarily discussed the doctrine of
respondeat superior and whether the hospital had the appropriate control to be held
liable for the physician’s actions.65 After a brief review of the facts,66 including
emergency room procedures set by the Ohio State University Hospital, the court held
it could not “find in the record any evidence showing that the procedures used in the
emergency room by the attending physician were set up by appellee so that appellee
could control the mode and manner of the work involved.”67 Thus, the court held the
hospital lacked sufficient control to find state employee status.
Five years after Latham, the Tenth District heard York v. University of Cincinnati
Medical Center.68 Again, in this case, a physician who worked as a professor for a
state-operated medical school claimed to be immune from suit due to state employee
status.69 And again, the court failed to mention any specific teaching with the
treatment of plaintiff’s decedent.70 But unlike others before it, this defendant
physician’s practice plan provided two percent of the fee for medical services to the

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

Latham v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 594 N.E.2d 1077 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).

64

Id. at 1079.

65

Id.

66

The facts included the following:
The attending physician at the emergency room (1) held the title of Assistant Clinical
Professor in the Department of Emergency Medicine at the Ohio State University, (2)
received payment from appellee for his services in the form of benefits such as
football tickets and the use of appellee's facilities, and (3) used procedures in the
emergency room that were set up by appellee.

Id.
67

Id.

68

York v. Univ. of Cincinnati Med. Ctr., No. 95API09-1117, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 1682
(Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 23, 1996).
69
70

Id. at *1-2.

However, it was the purpose of the defendant physician’s practice group to “carry out
and support the clinical practice and teaching functions of the Department.” Id. at *4.
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University of Cincinnati. The court, however, still proceeded to a relationship of
control, stating “an employment relationship will be found to exist only when one
party exercises the right to control the actions of another, and those actions are
directed toward an objective which the former seeks.”71 The court found that the
physician was not performing any duty under the control of UC when he treated the
plaintiff’s decedent; therefore, the duties performed fell outside the scope of
employment, and the physician did not have state-employee immunity.72
Months after York, the Tenth District heard Balson v. Ohio State University.73
Balson contains enough facts to determine a compelling likeness to Theobald, more
so than any other case to this point. Like Theobald, the physician in the case treated
a private patient, plaintiff’s decedent, with the assistance of a resident.74 Also, the
physician held the position of assistant professor at the Ohio State University.75
Additionally, the physician worked for a private practice group which was formed at
the university’s behest and contributed a percentage of its earnings to the medical
university.76 Unlike Theobald, however, based on the precedent of Katko and York,
the court concluded that the physician treated the patient in his private capacity,
“albeit ‘in connection with his employment’ at OSU.”77 Therefore, those actions
were explicitly outside the physician’s scope of employment.
The next case to come up on appeal, Norman v. Ohio State University Hospital,78
has a special significance to this article since the Theobald court cited it as the case
first setting out the “education factor.”79 Norman dealt with a physician, like in
previous cases, working for a state university medical school and a private practice
plan.80 Here, the physician’s duties under his university employment included
remaining on call for the clinic provided by the university hospital to supervise
residents.81 In this case, the plaintiff’s decedent was a patient who made reoccurring
71

Id. (citing Hanson v. Kynast, 494 N.E.2d 1091 (Ohio 1986)). Hanson factors for
determining control include: (1) whether the individual is performing in the course of the
principal's business rather than in some ancillary capacity; (2) whether the principal provided
the materials and place of work; (3) whether the individual offers his services to the public at
large or to one individual at a time; (4) the length of employment; (5) the right to terminate the
employee at will; and (6) whether the individual was receiving compensation from the
principal. Hanson, 494 N.E.2d at 1095, 1095 n.5.
72

York, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 1682, at *5.

73

Balson v. Ohio State Univ., 677 N.E.2d 1216 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).

74

Id. at 1217. The court stated that the patient was billed for work performed by a
resident. Id. at 1219. This is quite important since it is the first time the Tenth District
discusses students or residents being involved with treatment in question for an immunity
determination.
75

Id. at 1220.

76

Id. at 1218, 1220.

77

Id. at 1222.

78

Norman v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 686 N.E.2d 1146 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).

79

Theobald v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 827 N.E.2d 365, 375 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).

80

Norman, 686 N.E.2d at 1150-51.

81

Id. at 1150.
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visits to the clinic but had only been treated by the defendant physician the time in
question; thus, the court believed that the decedent was not a private patient but
rather a patient of the university.82
The court suggested that the lack of a private patient-doctor relationship
distinguished Norman from prior case law, which led to the grant of state employee
immunity to the defendant physician.83 Further, the fact that the university kept 70
percent of the fees for the defendant’s services, the physican only received 30
percent, and the physician’s private practice plan was entirely circumvented in the
collection and distribution process all influenced the court.84 And contrary to
Theobald’s representation, the court did not discuss any educational benefits the
university received from the physician’s services.
Chitwood v. University Medical Center adopted the rule from Norman. In
Chitwood, the defendant physician received immunity for treating a patient billed by
the physician’s private practice plan since both parties had stipulated the defendant
physician was within the scope of his employment with the university.85 The court
stated soon after in Scarberry v. Ohio State University Hospitals that:
[T]he university admitted in its answer and the parties had stipulated that
the physician was acting within the scope of his employment with the
university when he rendered care to the patient. The only legal conclusion
that could be drawn from such stipulation was that the physician was
entitled to immunity.86
Thus, the stipulation by the parties was the only reason why the physician in
Chitwood received immunity.
After the appellate court decided Chitwood, the case of Kaiser v. Flege
reaffirmed the Pre-Chitwood rule of Norman. The two major determining factors to
be used in finding whether a physician acted outside the scope of his or her
employment for a state university hospital are: “(1) whether the patient was a private
patient of the physician, rather than a patient of the university; and (2) the

82

Id. at 1151.

83

Id. The Norman court stated “[o]ne of the determining factors in finding that the
physicians in Katko, York, Balson and Harrison acted outside the scope of their employment
was that the patients therein were private patients of the physicians, rather than patients of the
universities.” Id. (emphasis added).
84

Id.

85

Chitwood v. Univ. Med. Ctr., No. 97API09-1235, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 2106, at *6
(Ohio Ct. App. May 5, 1998).
86
Scarberry v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., No. 98AP-143, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 5649, at
*14 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1998) (emphasis added). In Scarberry, the court found that the
defendant physician treated a patient, never said to have been a private patient, under his
duties to train and supervise residents and only in connection with his services to the state
university. Id. at *17-19. Additionally, the physician’s private practice billed the patient $151
for his services while the Ohio State University hospital billed the patient $151,358.78. See
also Ferguson v. Ohio State Univ. Med. Ctr., No. 98AP-863, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 2828, at
*9 (Ohio Ct. App. June 22, 1999).
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university's financial gain from the medical treatment at issue relative to the
physician's financial gain therefrom.”87
Kaiser is similar to previous cases. In Kaiser, a doctor treated plaintiff’s
decedent as a private patient and received payment through his private practice plan
rather than the UC Medical Center, the university facility with which this defendant
was affiliated.88 It was well agreed upon in this case that any teaching that may have
occurred during the treatment, such as instruction of residents or students, was
wholly “incidental” to the actual treatment.89 The court found that since plaintiff’s
decedent was a private patient of the defendant and the university’s financial gain
was minimal compared to that of the physician, the physician was not entitled to
state employee immunity.90
After Kaiser, the Tenth District heard a series of cases in which it expanded the
scope of immunity for those physicians who merely supervised, within the scope of
their employment with the state, the treatment of patients by residents.91 Because
these cases mostly involve emergency room situations, they are distinguished from
those cases determining whether a physician acts within the scope of employment.92
The first of these cases, Ferguson, dealt with a physician who did not meet with
the patient, but merely discussed the treatment with the treating resident.93 In the
next case, Hopper, the court found that even though multiple physicians were present
for each stage of decedent’s treatment, and a private practice plan billed decedent,
residents treated the decedent; therefore, the physicians acted within the scope of
employment with the state.94
The court then heard Kaiser II in which a resident treated a patient under the
supervision of an attending physician.95 The attending physician saw the patient for
only four minutes.96 The court ruled that even though the physician made the final
determination of admittance or release over the patient, his essential capacity was a
supervisory role, conducted within the scope of his employment with the state.97 The
last of these cases, Barkan, reiterated the rule of Kaiser II:

87
Kaiser v. Flege, No. 98AP-146, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 4458, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept.
22, 1998).
88

Id. at *2, *6-9.

89

Id. at *8.

90

Id. at *9.

91

Ferguson, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 2828; Hopper v. Univ.of Cincinnati, No. 99AP-787,
2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3456 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2000); Kaiser v. Ohio State Univ., No.
02AP-316, 2002, Ohio App. LEXIS 5848 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2002); Barkan v. Ohio State
Univ., No. 02AP-436, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 928 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2003).
92

Barkan, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 928, at *5-6.
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Ferguson, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 2828, at *5-6.
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Hopper, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3456, at *1-4, *10.
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Kaiser, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 5848, at *10.
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Id.
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Id. at *3.
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Although these cases identify and discuss a variety of different factors
relevant to an immunity determination, the key factor in this
determination is whether the patient was essentially the doctor's private
patient or whether the doctor treated the patient in his or her capacity as an
attending physician supervising residents.98
Barkan also involved an attending physician who briefly examined the patient
after an initial examination by a resident. The court again found that since the
resident undertook the decedent as a patient, and the physician merely supervised the
treatment, the physician had acted within his scope of employment with the state.99
The key fact in all of these cases is that the residents treated the patients, the
attending physicians did not. Another significant factor is that most of the cases
dealt with emergency room patients being treated immediately.100 The court held
that an emergency room situation is a distinguishing factor in the immunity
discussion since the patient is really a patient of the state rather than any specific
doctor.101 In this case the patient is not referred to a specific physician, but ends up
with an attending physician who is on call for the evening by chance. Also, the
admission of a patient to a hospital effectively forms an agency relationship between
the doctor and hospital imputing liability to the hospital for the physician’s actions
since the patient relies on the hospital for treatment.102 This concept could easily
transfer to physician immunity in the emergency room context since an emergency
room patient relies on the hospital for treatment rather than some specific physician.
Finally, in 2001, during the middle of the previous series of cases, the case of
Smith v. University of Cincinnati came before the court.103 In Smith, the court
determined whether a physician who operated on a patient with a surgery resident
present acted within the scope of employment with the state.104 In making its
determination, the court did not consider any “education factor,” but it primarily
considered the financial aspects of the case.105 It found that since the physician’s
98
Barkan v. Ohio State Univ., No. 02AP-436, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 928, at *5 (Ohio Ct.
App. Mar. 6, 2003).
99

Id. at * 12.

100

Hopper v. Univ. of Cincinnati, No. 99AP-787, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3456 (Ohio Ct.
App. Aug. 3, 2000).
101

Barkan, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 928, at *5-6.

102

The Supreme Court of Ohio stated:
A hospital may be held liable under the doctrine of agency by estoppel for the
negligence of independent medical practitioners practicing in the hospital when: (1) it
holds itself out to the public as a provider of medical services; and (2) in the absence
of notice or knowledge to the contrary, the patient looks to the hospital, as opposed to
the individual practitioner, to provide competent medical care.
Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46, Syllabus of the Court (Ohio
1994).
103

Smith v. Univ. of Cincinnati, No. 01AP-404, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 5271 (Ohio Ct.
App. Nov. 29, 2001).
104

Id. at *1.
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private practice plan directed all payments he had acted outside the scope of his
employment with the state in treating the patient.106
When viewed in its entirety, the history of physician immunity, and more
importantly, the determinative factors of acting “within the scope” of employment,
takes a sharp turn in Theobald. The Tenth District did not rely on any precedent that
would objectively lead to the blanket holding in Theobald that any physician
performing a teaching function while operating should be immune for the
educational benefit provided to the state. Instead, the precedent is clear that
physicians are immune only when supervising and/or guiding a resident’s treatment
of a patient or when a patient is a patient of the state hospital rather than the
physician himself. Therefore, Theobald created new law, rewriting section 9.86
immunity to grant much broader immunity to practitioners involved with the
education of students and residents and, thus, produced a judicial reform of medical
malpractice.
IV. COMPARING THEOBALD TO OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Since the Theobald court based its holding on section 9.86 of the Ohio Revised
Code, the state employee immunity statute, it is quite helpful to compare Ohio’s
governing statute and governing law of other jurisdictions to show the similarity or
differences in judicial application. A survey was conducted of eighteen states,
including Ohio, recording each state’s governing law and the subsequent applicable
rule of immunity, formed through judicial interpretation, on whether physicians
receive immunity when a student or resident is merely involved in the physician’s
treatment of a private patient, such as in Theobald.107 This situation is distinguished
from circumstances where a student or resident treats a patient under the supervision
of the physician, or a patient is treated as a patient of a hospital rather than of the
physician himself.
The governing laws for state employee immunity are broken into three
categories: Common Law, General Statutes on State Employee Immunity, and
Specific Statutes on State Employee Immunity.108 Specific statutes are distinguished
from general statutes by some specific requirement for state employee immunity
such as an employee must perform discretionary governmental functions, an
employee cannot personally profit from his or her actions, or, more applicable in this
case, an employee doctor must not treat a patient at the time in question.109
The rules formed through judicial interpretations and applications make up three
categories: Outside Scope of State Employment, Case-By-Case Determination of
Within/Outside Scope, and Within Scope of State Employment. The “Case-ByCase” rule allows for factual determinations of immunity, decided either by trial
105
Id. at *16. The court also considered that the procedure was performed in a private
hospital, but it did not appear to have as much weight as the financial aspects. Id.
106

Id.
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The author has provided two charts to categorize the various forms of governing law
and the practical rules of physician immunity. See infra Part VIII.
108

See id. “General statutes” and “specific statutes” are the author’s terminology used to
describe the different kinds of statutes dealing with state employee immunity.
109

See supra text accompanying note 108.
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courts as in Mississippi or juries as in Michigan.110 They differ from other states
since these courts lay out legal factors for dual agency, which a trier of fact must use
to determine whether state immunity applies to each separate set of facts.111 It is
possible that the “Case-By-Case” states could have different fact finders coming to
different conclusions on the same set of facts. All other states have set rules of law
leading to identical conclusions of immunity for identical sets of facts.112
Of the surveyed states, five were governed by “Common Law” immunity, six
were governed by “General Statutes,” and seven were governed by “Specific
Statutes.”113 Under the section outlining applicable rules of immunity for dual
agency for teaching while treating a private patient section, fifteen states are placed
in the “Outside Scope” category, two states are placed in the “Case-By-Case”
category and only Ohio is placed in the “Within Scope” category.114
From the simple outlook of the chart, Ohio seems to be an extreme minority
jurisdiction for applicable dual agency in the Theobald context.115 The question then
follows whether the statutory expression, or the root common law, has an effect on
the legal application. Statutory comparisons must then be made to determine
whether the Tenth District has a definite basis for such an outlying position.
The states categorized as having “Specific Statutes” shall be omitted from any
comparison since their statutes are inherently distinct from Ohio statute. A
comparison would reveal little about the quality of the Theobald decision since
specific statutes leave little to judicial interpretation.
A. Comparing Ohio and Other “General Statute” States
When looking deeper at the text of the general statutes, a group of states – Ohio,
Mississippi, Florida, and Georgia – have similar language for immunity.116 For
instance, these “conventional” general statutes have a pattern of consistency as
demonstrated by Georgia’s statute: “[a] state officer or employee who commits a tort
while acting within the scope of his or her official duties or employment is not
subject to lawsuit or liability therefore.”117
This kind of statute provides immunity generally to “officers” or “employees,”
and leaves a more specific determination of whether or not a party qualifies as a state
employee to the courts.118 Additionally, this kind of statute normally only requires
that the employee act within the scope of his or her official duties.119 The courts

110

See infra Part VIII.
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Id.

112

Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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GA. CODE ANN. § 50-21-25(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
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Id.
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Id.
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again have the ability to spell out what constitutes “within the scope.”120 Ohio is the
lone exception to this, expressly revoking immunity if an “officer or employee acted
with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.”121
Michigan, on the other hand, sets out a specific list of those with immunity:
“officer and employee of a governmental agency, each volunteer acting on behalf of
a governmental agency, and each member of a board, council, commission, or
statutorily created task.”122 Such a list relies much less on the courts to determine
whether or not a party qualifies as a state employee. The Michigan statute further
sets out a list of qualifications to be met for immunity:
(a) The officer, employee, member, or volunteer is acting or reasonably
believes he or she is acting within the scope of his or her authority.
(b) The governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a
governmental function.
(c) The officer's, employee's, member's, or volunteer's conduct does not
amount to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury or
damage.123
Those sections of Michigan’s statute further distinguish it from the
“conventional” general statutes. First, Michigan allows for immunity to apply in
situations where the doctor has a reasonable belief of acting within the scope of
authority. No other general statute surveyed allows for a “reasonable belief,” so it is
likely that the Michigan statute would apply in situations when no other state’s
statute would. This portion would also give reason for Michigan’s immunity
determination by jury trial since there is a greater possibility of disputed facts under
Michigan’s statute. Second, Michigan’s statute requires that the state employee or
officer be engaged in a “governmental function” during the tortious action. And
while governmental function is broadly defined,124 it may be an issue of limiting
immunity that would not occur in the “conventional” general statutes.
The third section of Michigan’s statute, requiring that an officer not be grossly
negligent, is similar to Ohio’s limitation on immunity when an employee acts with a
malicious purpose or in a wanton or reckless manner. The Michigan statute even
defines “gross negligence” as “so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of
concern for whether an injury results.”125 Thus, recklessness is a common place
element between the Ohio and Michigan statutes. For current purposes, however,
this similarity has little impact on Theobald-like analysis since gross negligence or
120

Id.
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OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 9.86 (LexisNexis 2006).
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MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1407(2) (2006).
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Id. (emphasis added).
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“Governmental function” is an activity that is expressly or impliedly mandated or
authorized by constitution, statute, local charter or ordinance, or other law. Governmental
function includes an activity, as directed or assigned by his or her public employer for the
purpose of public safety, performed on public or private property by a sworn law enforcement
officer within the scope of the law enforcement officer's authority. MICH. COMP. LAWS §
691.1401(f) (2006).
125

MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1407(7)(a) (2006).
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recklessness was never alleged. Therefore, the Michigan statute does not have as
high a quality in a comparison to the Ohio statute as the “conventional” general
statutes.
Louisiana, conversely, does not fit into the group of “conventional” statutes, but
its elements are similar. It, like the “conventional” states, requires merely that any
employee receiving immunity be “acting within the course and scope of their
duties.”126 The difference between Louisiana and the “conventional” states is that
Louisiana’s statute only addresses “state entities which may provide any kind of
health care” and those employees who “provid[e] health care in connection with such
state entity.”127 There is no general grant of immunity to all state employees.
Despite this fact, the statute is similar enough to the “conventional” general statutes
to compare the court’s application since it leaves to the courts to decide the scope of
duty.
Accordingly, out of the five statutes that are compared under the general statute
section, Ohio allows for practitioner immunity when dually treating a patient and
teaching a student. Mississippi has no set law in such a scenario, but generally
provides that trial courts use a set of five factors to determine whether or not
immunity should attach. Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana provide that a medical
practitioner may not receive immunity since he or she has acted outside the scope of
his or her employment.
Georgia is quite clear that the relationship with the patient outweighs state duties;
thus, no immunity can attach to any malpractice action.128 Florida holds that the
most important factor is that of the relationship between the doctor and patient, and
while immunity may be granted if the patient was not a private patient, the doctorpatient relationship outweighs any dual agency with the state.129 Likewise, Louisiana
allows for suit of a private patient in dual agency situations distinguishing the roles
of duty owed to the state and those owed to the patient.130
Mississippi and Ohio both stray from this common theme. One explanation of
this may be that the Mississippi statute states “it shall be a rebuttable presumption
that any act or omission of an employee within the time and at the place of his
employment is within the course and scope of his employment.”131 Likewise, Ohio’s
statute may set a higher burden by stating an employee does not receive immunity if
his actions “were manifestly outside the scope of his employment.”132 The language
“manifestly” would require that the actions were “obviously” outside the scope of
employment. This may possibly act like the rebuttable presumption and put a higher
burden on the party challenging immunity.133
126

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.39(A)(1)(a)(i) (2006).

127

Id.
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Keenan v. Plouffe, 482 S.E.2d 253, 257 (Ga. 1997).
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See Martin v. Drylie, 560 So. 2d 1285, 1289 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.1990).
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Landry v. Leonard J. Chabert Med. Ctr., 858 So. 2d 454, 464 (La. Ct. App. 2003).
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MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-7(7) (2006) (emphasis added).
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OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 9.86 (LexisNexis 2006) (emphasis added).
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See “Manifest,” MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/manifest (last visited Mar. 22, 2007).
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However, both the “rebuttable presumption” and “manifest weight of evidence”
deal with burdens of proof rather than the scope of employment themselves. Thus,
any argument that they would expand the scope to dual agency roles would probably
fail. Also, the Theobald court’s reasoning does not mention the specific weight
given to the word “manifest” so it is assumed that it has little effect on the dual
agency decision.
Ultimately, it appears that there is no real distinguishing factor to “justify” why
the Tenth District has taken a drastically different approach than the other general
immunity statute states. Such evidence supports the argument that Theobald was
decided wrongly.
B. Comparing Ohio and Common Law States
From the onset, it appears important to compare Ohio’s statute and law to those
of the common law states. The common law states may represent the ideas that the
Ohio legislature tried to codify in section 9.86. Also, the fact that all common law
jurisdictions hold practitioners in dual agency are acting outside the scope of state
employment could emphasize the divergent path the Tenth District has taken from
the conventional grant of immunity.
However, all of the common law restatements either require or emphasize
“discretionary acts” of the state employee for receiving immunity, generally known
as “governmental discretion.” “Governmental discretion” is defined by situations
when an actor must use his or her own judgment in the performance of his
functions.134 It can best be defined by what it is not, which is called a “ministerial
duty.” “Ministerial duties” are those performed in a “prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to his own judgment or
opinion concerning the propriety of the act to be performed.”135 Medical discretion,
used during medical care, has been defined within “ministerial duties” by three of the
common law states - Missouri, Alabama, and Texas.136 Thus, a medical
practitioner’s failure to meet the standard of care falls outside “governmental
discretion” so that immunity does not attach in these jurisdictions.
Two other common law states, Virginia and North Carolina, do not touch on the
issue of “governmental discretion” versus “ministerial duties.” Instead, they both
simply maintain that practitioners do not receive immunity for their actions with a
patient.137 Virginia is especially animate that medical practitioners not receive
immunity stating that a “failure to use such care in the treatment of patients is a
violation of their duty to the patients and a departure from a condition of their
employment.”138 Thus, if a practitioner breaches the standard of care, he also
breaches his duty to the state, which falls outside the scope of employment.
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Collins v. N.C. Parole Comm’n, 473 S.E.2d 1, 3 (N.C. 1996).
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Jackson v. Wilson, 581 S.W.2d 39, 42-3 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
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Id. See also Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 406 (Ala. 2000); Mussemann v.
Villarreal, 178 S.W.3d 319, 320-23 (Tex. App. 2005).
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See Urquhart v. Univ. Health Sys. of E. Carolina, Inc., 566 S.E.2d 143, 145 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2002); James v. Jane, 282 S.E.2d 864, 870 (Va. 1980).
138

James, 282 S.E.2d at 870.
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All of the judicially expressed common law rules differ from section 9.86 of the
Ohio Revised Code; therefore, it is inappropriate to compare them to the Tenth
District’s interpretation.
C. Conclusion of State Comparisons
The Theobald court’s reading of section 9.86 should only be compared to those
states which have similar general immunity statutes. All other states have far too
different base rules to judge the quality of the Tenth District’s judicial interpretation.
In the context of the similar general statutes, Ohio stands alone in holding that
medical practitioners shall receive state employee immunity for dual agency
situations involving the treatment of a private patient and education of a student or
resident. When Ohio is compared to all other jurisdictions, its outlier status is even
more apparent, showing that the holding in Theobald is probably “unjustifiable.”
Ohio has fallen behind both on the separation of principles in dual agency and the
significant relationship between a medical practitioner and his patient. This
assessment is especially true, considering that Theobald actively changed the law
and shattered well-settled Ohio precedent.139
V. POLICY ISSUES OF THEOBALD
Because courts have been known for making decisions based on policy rather
than law, and Theobald’s holding lacks strong legal support, it is appropriate to look
at policy issues adverse to the benefits of the medical practitioners and medical
schools. Here, the greatest effects are the practical effects on plaintiffs bringing a
suit similar to Theobald and the medical service markets as a whole.
A. Effect on Forum
Before Theobald, a plaintiff who wished to sue her private physician for
malpractice merely filed suit in the local Court of Common Pleas. However, due to
this decision and section 9.86 immunity, the Court of Common Pleas is no longer the
proper venue. Once the defendant has asserted immunity, the plaintiff must now
bring the suit to the Court of Claims as it has sole jurisdiction over claims against the
state and claims against state employees.140 Additionally, the Court of Claims has
sole jurisdiction to determine whether an “employee” of the State has § 9.86
immunity.141 Thus, Theobald requires all cases in which a medical professional

139

See supra Part III.

140

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(F) (LexisNexis 2006).

141
Conley v. Shearer, 595 N.E.2d 862, 866-67 (Ohio 1992) (holding that jurisdiction to
determine immunity of a state employee has been taken away from the common pleas court;
Court of Claims now has exclusive jurisdiction to determine this). See also Johns v. Univ. of
Cincinnati Med. Assoc., 804 N.E.2d 19, 24 (Ohio 2004) (explaining that the Court of Claims
is the only court that may determine immunity for employees; plaintiffs must file in the court
within a timely manner under sections 2743.02 and 2743.16); Clark v. Alberini, No. 2001-T0015, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 5665 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2001) (holding that no matter
what the Court of Claims must always first decide the issue of immunity before a suit may
proceed in the Court of Common Pleas). See generally White v. Bragg, No. 2001-T-0015, 04CA-50, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 516 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2005); Cullen v. Ohio Dep't of
Rehab. & Corr., 709 N.E.2d 583 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (stating that the Court of Claims has
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treats a patient with observations made by a student or resident to proceed to an
immunity determination in the Court of Claims.
Furthermore, plaintiffs should bring all suits to the Court of Claims, even when a
defendant has yet to assert state employee immunity, since waiver is extremely
difficult to achieve.142 And while a defendant may contend that she was not a state
employee at the time of treatment, such a claim may have little bearing on the
outcome of an immunity determination.143 Plaintiffs’ best course of action is staying
their proceeding in the Court of Common Pleas until the Court of Claims has made
the proper immunity determination.144
Therefore, Theobald burdens malpractice plaintiffs in their suits against negligent
practitioners by forcing them to bring their cases to two separate fora. Furthermore,
there is confusion surrounding the procedure that plaintiffs must follow. This leaves
outstanding claims susceptible to a dismissal based on semantics rather than reaching
the substantive issues of the case.

sole jurisdiction to determine whether doctors are immune from suit as employees of the State
of Ohio).
142

An affirmative defense may be raised only by (1) expressly using that defense as part of
a pre-pleading Civ. R. 12(B) motion to dismiss, (2) expressly setting forth that defense in a
responsive pleading pursuant to Civ. R. 8(C), or (3) by amending one's responsive pleading
pursuant to Civ. R. 15 so as to include that defense. . . . A failure to utilize any of these three
methods for raising an affirmative defense will result in a waiver thereof. (emphasis added).
Spence v. Liberty Twp. Tr., 672 N.E.2d 213, 219 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (emphasis added).
However, direction further provides that “[l]eave of court shall be freely given when justice so
requires.” OHIO R. CIV. P. 15(A) (2006). This grants such broad leeway for amendments that
courts have allowed amended responsive pleadings even after a case has begun its trial phase.
Leibson v. Ohio Dep’t of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, 618 N.E.2d 232, 238 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1992). Therefore, waiver may not take effect until a judgment has been entered.
Additionally, if the parties expressly or impliedly consent to go forward as if an affirmative
defense had been asserted, then no pleading whatsoever shall be required by the court. OHIO
R. CIV. P. 15(B) (2006). Finally, Ohio appellate districts are split on whether or not a general
pre-pleading 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim preserves the right to assert
immunity after judgment has been entered, even when the 12(b)(6) motion is not explicit on its
face that immunity exists. Spence, 672 N.E.2d at 217-18. The Fourth district has stated a
general 12(B)(6) will not preserve an immunity defense, whereas the Twelfth and Eighth
districts have allowed the preservation. Id. Therefore, even after judgment, waiver may still
be asserted. Id.
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Theobald v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 827 N.E.2d 365, 372 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (stating
“[n]either Nurse Parrott's admission that she was not an UC employee nor her testimony that
she was not compensated by UC is dispositive of her employment status”), aff’d, 857 N.E.2d
573 (Ohio 2006).
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Authority for granting a stay found in Walker v. Steinbacher, 523 N.E.2d 352, Syllabus
of the Court (Ohio Ct. App. 1987). The Syllabus states in its entirety: “[w]hen state
employees are sued in their official and individual capacities in the court of common pleas, the
court should stay proceedings until the Court of Claims determines whether the defendants'
conduct was outside the scope of their employment because it was malicious, in bad faith,
wanton or reckless. The court of common pleas may not grant an ‘interlocutory order of
dismissal’ pending the Court of Claims' determination of the applicability of the statutory
immunity provided by R.C. 9.86 and 2743.02(A)(1); the better practice is for the court to stay
proceedings upon such terms as are appropriate.” Id.
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B. Effect on Damages Recoverable
Most disturbing about Theobald is its limitation of damage awards for plaintiffs
who suffer harm due to medical malpractice. While the state itself is liable when
immunity is granted, there are greater limitations on damages recoverable in suits
against the state than medical practitioners in their private capacity. One may
speculate whether the decision was politically motivated to both reduce the total
recovery of plaintiffs and to ease the burden of malpractice insurance for private
doctors.145
In any case, the controlling cap on damages has changed from section 2323.43 of
the Ohio Revised Code, limiting medical malpractice awards, to section 3345.40,
limiting awards against the state.146 While both caps (1) allow full recovery on
economic damages, (2) generally act to limit non-economic damages to $250,000,
and (3) do not apply to suits brought for wrongful death under chapter 2125 of the
Ohio Revised Code, there still exists a profound disparity in granting exceptions.147
Specifically, section 3345.40 provides for a $250,000 cap on claims against the State
of Ohio for non-economic or “non-actual loss” with no exceptions. Such “non-actual
losses” include: “fees paid or owed to an attorney . . . pain and suffering, for the loss
of society, consortium, companionship, care, assistance, attention, protection, advice,
guidance, counsel, instruction, training, or education of an injured person, for mental
anguish, or for any other intangible loss.”148
Likewise, section 2323.43 explicitly includes in its non-economic recovery list
most of the losses from the “non-actual loss” list in section 3345.137.149 However,
section 2323.43 allows for recovery of non-economic damages greater than $250,000
in certain situations. First, a plaintiff may recover non-economic damages up to
three times the amount of economic damages, not exceeding $350,000 for a plaintiff
or $500,000 for each occurrence.150 In this way, the $250,000 cap acts to limit large
scale non-economic damage awards where actual loss is low since any awards
exceeding $83,333 in economic damages will be exempted from the $ 250,000 cap.
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The political push for medical malpractice reform has been well documented; most
notably the push comes from President Bush who has proposed a cap of $250,000 for noneconomic damages. CNN.com, Bush Outlines Medical Liability Reform, http://www.cnn.com/
2003/ALLPOLITICS/01/16/bush.malpractice/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2007); Jeffrey Birnbaum
& John Harris, President's Proposed Remedy to Curb Medical Malpractice Lawsuits Stalls,
WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2005, at A05, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
articles/A21931-2005Apr2.html; GOP.com - Republican National Committee, Legal Reform,
http://www.gop.com/Issues/Legal Reform/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2007).
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OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.43 (LexisNexis 2006) (listing the generally applicable
cap on damages for economic and non-economic damages in medical claim). Section 3345.40
limits the damages for claims against the State. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3345.40 (LexisNexis
2006). Since doctors receive immunity, all malpractice claims covered by Theobald must be
brought against the State of Ohio. § 2323.43(G)(1).
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OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3345.40(B)(3), 2323.43(A)(2)-(3), (G)(3) (LexisNexis 2006).
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See id. § 3345.40(A)(2)(b).
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See id. § 2323.43(A)(2).
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Section 2323.43 also grants a second exception where a plaintiff may recover up
to $500,000 of non-economic loss or $1 million for all plaintiffs in an occurrence if
the plaintiff suffers either: “(a) [p]ermanent and substantial physical deformity, loss
of use of a limb, or loss of a bodily organ system; [or] (b) [p]ermanent physical
functional injury that permanently prevents the injured person from being able to
independently care for [him]self and perform life sustaining activities.”151 Thus,
section 2323.43 takes into account the severity of the outcome from malpractice and
attempts to “make the plaintiff whole” through monetary means. section 3345.40
makes no such exception.
In Theobald, if Mr. and Mrs. Theobald had been able to sue together under
section 2323.43, the general malpractice statute, they would have been able to
receive up to $1,000,000 in non-economic damages due to Mr. Theobald’s
permanent loss of the use of his arms and eyes.152 The Tenth District’s decision,
however, took away their right to recover that amount by placing them under the
$250,000 inflexible cap of section 3345.40. By removing upwards of $750,000 of
compensation for severe loss caused by medical malpractice, this ruling
demonstrates the real impact on real people. Therefore, the Theobald ruling
unfortunately deprives malpractice victims of a significant amount of recovery to be
“made whole” through monetary compensation.
C. Economic Effects on Medical Services Market
Besides the more practical effects of Theobald, this case may also have
burdensome consequences on the medical services market. If so, this would
demonstrate that further policy considerations oppose the court’s holding, much like
the practical considerations. Foremost, this opinion removes all economic incentive
that would otherwise provoke greater care on the part of private medical practitioners
and, thus, better care for patients. Additionally, it creates a heavy burden on the
State to compensate loss for the negligence of these doctors.
First, when courts hold doctors and other medical practitioners liable for medical
malpractice, a practitioner’s insurer will usually cover the cost of litigation and
judgment against the doctor. The insurer’s cost subsequently relies on the
negligence of the insured because more suits will lead to greater cost to defend the
insured and more judgments against practitioners, which are paid by the insurer. The
insurer in turn passes that cost on to the insured practitioners, charging greater
insurance premiums for higher risk insureds.
The Theobald ruling directly reduces costs for insurers of practitioners who
qualify for immunity because a large portion of claims against their insureds will
now be immune from suit. This could lead to insurers cutting insurance rates for
private practitioners that will receive immunity. For instance, if an insurer takes a
survey and determines that one doctor will have a student with him for half of his
patients, his liability insurance premiums could be reduced by half since he is half as
likely to be liable.
Further, if an insurer, when determining insurance premiums, does not take
account for claims against the State due to a particular doctor’s negligence while
151
152

See id. § 2323.43(A)(3).

See id. § 2323.43(A)(3); Theobald v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 827 N.E.2d 365, 368-69
(Ohio Ct. App. 2005), aff’d, 857 N.E.2d 573 (Ohio 2006).
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immune, there will be no economic disincentive for malpractice of the immune
doctor. That specific doctor could be negligent in dealing with fifty percent of his
patients and, as long as students or residents are present for treatment, he will suffer
no adverse consequences financially. Removal of the disincentive could then lead to
increased negligence because doctors have less reason to follow the standard of care,
consequently leading to worse services provided to consumers. Particularly, these
physicians may attempt riskier treatment of a patient when following the standard of
care would work just as well.
And while some may argue that the doctors’ fear of consumer response in
demand markets will create the necessary economic disincentive to balance off the
elimination of liability disincentive, a free market economist will point out that the
medical services market has artificial restrictions, thus, restricting supply and
limiting competition.153 Since the American Medical Association, through political
influence, has been successful in efforts to control the amount of new doctors
entering the practice of medicine, competition suffers and market incentive
arguments fail because there is a fixed supply of doctors with a limited amount of
time to treat patients.154 Even if a free market would allow consumers to completely
reject a particular physician’s services, the necessity of treatment and scarcity of
supply would make a broad-based rejection of physicians affected by Theobald
impractical.
Also, many consumers of medical services are not sophisticated in researching
doctors to know their history of malpractice.155 And even if a consumer is
sophisticated, most “lay” people see medical malpractice plaintiffs as guilty of
bringing a frivolous claim until proven otherwise.156 This point of view prevents
153

“[T]he American Medical Association and other industry groups have predicted a glut
of doctors and worked to limit the number of new physicians. In 1994, the Journal of the
American Medical Association predicted a surplus of 165,000 doctors by 2000.” Dennis
Cauchon, Medical Miscalculation Creates Doctor Shortage, USA TODAY, Mar. 3, 2005, at
1A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2005-03-02-doctor-shortage_x.htm.
The number of doctors is a political decision, heavily influenced by doctors themselves. Id.
154

Dale Steinreich, Ludwig von Mises Institute, 100 Years of Medical Robbery, June 10,
2004, available at http:// www.mises.org/story/1547 (citing MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM
AND FREEDOM 152 (University of Chicago 1982) (1962)).
155

Andrea Stephenson, Medical Information on the Internet, http://www.floridahealthstat.
com/publications/fhcj/stephenson.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2006) (discussing the fact that
elderly need medical information the most, but have the least sophistication to get that
information on the internet, where most information is posted). See also Lorraine S. Wallace,
The Impact of Limited Literacy on Health Promotion in the Elderly, 2 CALIFORNIAN J. HEALTH
PROMOTION 1 (2004), http://www.csuchico.edu/cjhp/2/3/01-04-wallace.pdf (last visited Oct.
10, 2006) (discussing limited literacy of elderly consumers).
156
“According to Dr. Ellen Leggett of the Leggett Jury Research, their database reflects
that one-third of jurors nationally believe that the people who file medical malpractice cases
are looking for easy money; two-thirds believe that plaintiff lawyers pressured patients into
filing malpractice suits; many believe that malpractice cases are driving up their medical
insurance rates, and half of the jurors believe that malpractice cases are ruining the health care
system in this country.” Howard L. Nations, Overcoming Jury Bias, 11 MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE: LAW & STRATEGY 1 (1992), available at http://www.howardnations.com/
overcomingjurybias/OJB.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2007).
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most perspective patients from considering malpractice suits when choosing a
doctor, thereby, making “market correction” improbable. Furthermore, many
patients choose their physicians, or other medical service providers, through referrals
or assignment in times of urgency. In these situations, the patient relies on the
referral. Such reliance makes it less likely that the average consumer of medical
services would conduct an investigation of the new practitioner’s background and
end the relationship.
Lastly, with Ohio’s overwhelming budget deficit, estimated to be in the $1 billion
range for 2006, the court disregarded the burden these malpractice actions place on
society.157 The extra cost for the state will deprive budgetary funding from other
areas that society may deem worthier than a negligent physician, such as education,
public transportation, preventative medical treatment, relief money for economically
deprived areas. Therefore, this ruling negatively affects consumer markets and
general society. The court should have considered these factors in making its
decision.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Tenth District’s opinion in Theobald seems to have little support, either in
the trends of the State of Ohio or in conventional interpretation of a statute similar to
Ohio’s section 9.86. Further, while such legal “justification” may be unnecessary if
a policy interest so commands, there exists strong policy interests opposing the
expanding role of state employee immunity in medical malpractice suits. Plaintiffs
not only must deal with procedural complications, but also lose out on the chance to
recover up to $750 million more than if the suit was against a medical practitioner in
his private capacity. Additionally, the patients of the State of Ohio may receive a
lesser quality of health care due to the removal of the economic disincentive. Any
reduction in the standard of care that may occur is too much when patients’ lives are
at stake. Finally, the already burdened state budget will now have to bear an added
weight; consequently, harming some other state program, which helps people who
are not wealthy medical practitioners. In light of these implications, review and
reversal of Theobald is proper.
VII. EPILOGUE
On December 13, 2006, the Supreme Court of Ohio issued an opinion on the
Theobalds’ appeal from the Tenth District.158 The Court affirmed the lower court’s
decision, granting immunity to medical practitioners, based on section 9.86 of the
Ohio Revised Code, anytime they treat a patient as long as they act in a dual role to
“teach” an “involved” student or resident.159
In its analysis, the court only discussed the issue of whether the “individual
[medical practitioners] act[ed] within the scope of employment when the cause of
action arose.”160 Like the appellate court, the Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed past
157
Pamela M. Prah, Billion-Dollar Deficits Greet Several Statehouses, Stateline.org,
http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.action?siteNodeId=136&languageId=1&contentId=15
928 (last visited Oct. 10, 2006).
158

Theobald v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 857 N.E.2d 573 (Ohio 2006).

159

Id.

160

Id. at 577.
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cases on medical practitioner dual agency, noting that the old “financial factor” test
had been eroded since the advent of the “educational factor” in Norman.161 It then
agreed with the Tenth District’s implementation of the “educational factor” test as
the only test for whether a practitioner had acted in the scope of employment since
“the question of scope of employment must turn on what the practitioner’s duties are
as a state employee and whether the practitioner was engaged in those duties at the
time of an injury.”162 It then concluded that a medical practitioner employed by the
state to teach, who is teaching a student or resident at the time of malpractice, shall
receive state employee immunity.
The dissent argued that due to the great burden this rule places on plaintiffs,
requiring simultaneous suits in the Court of Claims and Common Pleas, the appellate
court should have been overturned and immunity not granted. The dissent then
challenged the claim that a practitioner is in fact teaching when a student is merely
present in the room:
[D]octors are busy professionals, often called upon to make irreversible
decisions of the utmost magnitude with little time for reflection, and they
make mistakes. When they do, whether they are immune from liability
should not depend solely on whether a student is present. Teaching by
osmosis is not the same as talking a resident through an operation. The
mere presence of a student does not establish that instruction is taking
place.163
The dissent then moved onto policy issues of cost-shifting and the lack of a jury
trial. For cost-shifting, it argued that it would likely saddle the state with many
judgments, yet not reduce insurance premiums because insurance companies “cannot
know in advance whether any future negligence will occur in the presence of a
student.”164 It then argued that the constitutional right to a jury trial was disturbed by
this decision, forcing more cases to the Court of Claims, where there is no jury
trial.165

161

Id. at 579.

162

Id. at 580.

163

Id. at 581-82.

164

Id. at 582.

165

Id. at 583.
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VIII. APPENDIX: PHYSICIAN IMMUNITY CHARTS166
A. Governing Law of Immunity
Governing Law of Immunity
Common Law
Alabama
Restatement grants immunity to
“agent” when:
(1) formulating policy;
(2) exercising judgment in the
administration of a government
agency;
(3) discharging duties imposed
on an agency and prescribed by
statute;
(4) enforcing criminal laws; or
(5) discharging statutory duties
relating to releasing prisoners,
counseling persons of unsound
mind, or educating students.167

Statutory –
General
Ohio
“Except for civil actions that
arise out of the operation of a
motor vehicle and civil actions
in which the state is the
plaintiff, no officer or employee
shall be liable in any civil action
that arises under the law of this
state for damage or injury
caused in the performance of
his duties, unless the officer's or
employee's actions were
manifestly outside the scope of
his employment or official
responsibilities, or unless the
officer or employee acted with
malicious purpose, in bad faith,
or in a wanton or reckless
manner.”168
“‘Officer or employee’ means
[]: A person who, at the time a
cause of action against the
person arises, is serving in an
elected or appointed office or
position with the state or is
employed by the state.”169

166

See supra text accompanying note 108.

167

Ex parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 913 (Ala. 2000).

168

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 9.86 (LexisNexis 2006).

169

Statutory Specific
Colorado
“‘Public employee’
includes [] [a]ny health
care practitioner employed
part-time by and holding a
clinical faculty
appointment at a public
entity as to any injury
caused by a health care
practitioner-in-training
under such health care
practitioner's supervision.
Any such person shall
maintain the status of a
public employee when
such person engages in
supervisory and
educational activities over
a health care practitionerin-training at a nonpublic
entity if said activities are
within the course and
scope of such person's
responsibilities as an
employee of a public
entity.”170

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.36(A)(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2006). The statute specifically
names doctors as de jure employees in certain instances, but does not do so in this case. Id.
170

COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-103(4)(b)(II) (2006).
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Texas
“Ordinarily, public officials
must show the following
elements to establish a defense
of official immunity:
(1) the performance of a
discretionary function,
(2) in good faith, and
(3) within the scope of the
employee's authority.”171

Mississippi
“An employee may be joined in
an action against a
governmental entity in a
representative capacity if the act
or omission complained of is
one for which the governmental
entity may be liable, but no
employee shall be held
personally liable for acts or
omissions occurring within the
course and scope of the
employee's duties.”172
“[I]t shall be a rebuttable
presumption that any act or
omission of an employee within
the time and at the place of his
employment is within the
course and scope of his
employment.”173
“‘Employee’ means any officer,
employee or servant of the State
of Mississippi or a political
subdivision of the state,
including elected or appointed
officials and persons acting on
behalf of the state or a political
subdivision in any official
capacity, temporarily or
permanently, in the service of
the state or a political
subdivision whether with or
without compensation.”174
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New Jersey
“[A] public employee is
liable for injury caused by
this act or omission to the
same extent as a private
person.”175
“Except for an
examination or diagnosis
for the purpose of
treatment, neither a public
entity nor a public
employee is liable for
injury caused by the
failure to make a physical
or mental examination, or
to make an adequate
physical or mental
examination, of any person
for the purpose of
determining whether such
person has a disease or
physical or mental
condition that would
constitute a hazard to the
health or safety of himself
or others. For the purposes
of this section, ‘public
employee’ includes a
private physician while
actually performing
professional services for a
public entity as a volunteer
without compensation.”176

171

Mussemann v. Villarreal, 178 S.W.3d 319, 323 (Tex. App. 2005) (citing Kassen v.
Hatley, 887 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tex. 1994)).
172

MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-7(2) (2006).

173

§ 11-46-7(7).

174

MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-1(f) (2006). Like Ohio, this statute specifically names
doctors as de jure employees in certain instances, but does not do so in this case. Id.
175

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:3-1(a) (West 2006).

176

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:6-4 (West 2006).
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Missouri
“The Missouri rule is in line
with the general run of authority
that a public officer charged
with discretionary duties is not
liable for a mistake of judgment
or an erroneous performance of
said duties unless he be guilty
of willful wrong in relation
thereto, but that as to ministerial
duties he is liable for the
violation or neglect thereof to
the party injured thereby and
that a mistake of judgment does
not excuse him.”177

Florida
“No officer, employee, or agent
of the state or of any of its
subdivisions shall be held
personally liable in tort or
named as a party defendant in
any action for any injury or
damage suffered as a result of
any act, event, or omission of
action in the scope of her or his
employment or function.”178

Oklahoma
“Physician faculty
members and staff of the
University of Oklahoma
Health Sciences Center
and the College of
Osteopathic Medicine of
Oklahoma State University
not acting in an
administrative capacity or
engaged in teaching duties
are not employees or
agents of the state.”179

North Carolina
“As long as a public officer
lawfully exercises the judgment
and discretion with which he is
invested by virtue of his office,
keeps within the scope of his
official authority, and acts
without malice or corruption, he
is protected from liability.”180

Georgia
“A state officer or employee
who commits a tort while acting
within the scope of his or her
official duties or employment is
not subject to lawsuit or liability
therefore.”181

Illinois
“The state statutorily
grants immunity on a
limited basis, it has been
argued that the following
section should apply to
doctors:
“[A] public employee
serving in a position
involving the
determination of policy or
the exercise of discretion
is not liable for an injury
resulting from his act or
omission in determining
policy when acting in the
exercise of such discretion
even though abuse.”182

95

177
Jackson v. Wilson, 581 S.W.2d 39, 42-43 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979). Ministerial Functions
are defined as “of a clerical nature which a public officer is required to perform upon a given
state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without
regard to his own judgment or opinion concerning the propriety of the act to be performed.”
Id. at 43.
178

FLA. STAT. § 768.28(9)(a) (2006).

179

OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 152(5)(b) (2006).

180

Collins v. N.C. Parole Comm’n, 473 S.E. 2d 1, 7-8 (N.C. 1996) (quoting Smith v. State,
222 S.E. 2d 412, 430 (N.C. 1976)).
181

GA. CODE ANN. § 50-21-25(a) (2006).

182

745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/2-2001 (2006).
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Virginia
In determining whether a stateemployed physician is entitled
to the protection of sovereign
immunity, a court must apply a
four-factor test consisting of:
“(1) the nature of the function
performed by the employee,
(2) the extent of the state's
interest and involvement in that
function,
(3) the degree of control
exercised by the state over the
employee, and
(4) whether the alleged
negligent act involved the use of
judgment and discretion.”183

Michigan
“[E]ach officer and employee of
a governmental agency, each
volunteer acting on behalf of a
governmental agency, and each
member of a board, council,
commission, or statutorily
created task force of a
governmental agency is
immune from tort liability for
an injury to a person or damage
to property caused by the
officer, employee, or member
while in the course of
employment or service or
caused by the volunteer while
acting on behalf of a
governmental agency if all of
the following are met:
(a) The officer, employee,
member, or volunteer is acting
or reasonably believes he or she
is acting within the scope of his
or her authority.
(b) The governmental agency
is engaged in the exercise or
discharge of a governmental
function.
(c) The officer's, employee's,
member's, or volunteer's
conduct does not amount to
gross negligence that is the
proximate cause of the injury or
damage.”184
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Wisconsin
“No suit may be brought
against any volunteer fire
company organized under
ch. 213, political
corporation, governmental
subdivision or any agency
thereof for the intentional
torts of its officers,
officials, agents or
employees nor may any
suit be brought against
such corporation,
subdivision or agency or
volunteer fire company or
against its officers,
officials, agents or
employees for acts done in
the exercise of legislative,
quasi-legislative, judicial
or quasi-judicial
functions.”186

“This act does not grant
immunity to a governmental
agency or an employee or agent
of a governmental agency with
respect to providing medical
care or treatment to a patient,
except medical care or
treatment provided to a patient
in a hospital owned or operated
by the department of
community health.”185

183

McCloskey v. Kane, 604 S.E.2d 59, 61 (Va. 2004) (citing James v. Jane, 282 S.E.2d
864, 869 (Va. 1980)). Generally, Virginia’s statutes provide for specific times for immunity;
when outside of the statute, a common law approach applies. Id.
184

MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1407(2) (2006).
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Louisiana
“‘State health care provider’ or
‘person covered by this Part’
means: The state or any of its . .
. universities, facilities,
hospitals, clinics, [] health care
units, ambulances, [] university
health centers, and other state
entities which may provide any
kind of health care whatsoever,
and the officers, officials, and
employees thereof when acting
within the course and scope of
their duties in providing health
care in connection with such
state entity.187

Minnesota
“Any claim based upon the
performance or the failure
to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or
duty, whether or not the
discretion is abused.”189

“[T]he state shall pay any
damages, interest, cost of
investigation and defense, and
any other costs in connection
with any claim lodged against
any state health care provider
for an alleged act of medical
malpractice. . . . The coverage
provided herein shall apply only
when the state health care
provider is acting within the
terms of the definition of ‘state
health care provider. . . .’”188
Tennessee
“State officers and
employees are absolutely
immune from liability for
acts or omissions within
the scope of the officer's or
employee's office or
employment, except for
willful, malicious, or
criminal acts or omissions
or for acts or omissions
done for personal gain.”190

185

§ 691.1407(4).

186

WIS. STAT. § 893.80(4) (2006).

187

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.39(A)(1)(a)(i) (2006).

188

§ 40:1299.39(g).

189

MINN. STAT. § 466.03 Subd. 6 (2006).

190

TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-307(h) (2006).
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B. Applicable Rule of Immunity When Teaching Through Treatment and Dual
Agency with Private Organization
Outside Scope
Florida
In one case similar to Theobald,
the court overruled a granting of
summary judgment based on
physician immunity since there
was a factual dispute as to his
function at the time of the
surgery, including whether or
not any physicians-in-training
assisted in the procedure.191
Further, the court stated that the
critical issue in determining
immunity is that of the
relationship between the doctor
and patient, in reference to the
supervision of another doctor or
direct treatment of the patient.192
Immunity is probably not
available here under the
circumstances in Theobald.

Case-By-Case
Mississippi
Five factors are offered to
determine immunity:
1. the nature and function
performed by the employee;
2. the extent of the state's
interest and involvement in the
function;
3. the degree of control and
direction exercised by the state
over the employee;
4. whether the act complained
of involved the use of
judgment and discretion; and
5. whether the physician
receives compensation, either
directly or indirectly, from the
patient for professional
services rendered.193
Immunity is determined by the
trial court. Courts have held
the state has an interest in
having a ready pool of
candidates, so in most cases, a
doctor is probably immune.194
However, these cases do not
discuss dual agency where the
medical practitioner receives
payment from a private patient.

Within Scope
Ohio
Theobald's Rule: “[A]
practitioner is acting within
the scope of his
employment if he educates
a student or resident by
direct instruction,
demonstration,
supervision, or simple
involvement of the student
or resident in the patient's
care.”195 Also, the
relationship between the
patient and doctor does not
matter at all; this includes
the private patients of the
doctor.196

191

Martin v. Drylie, 560 So. 2d 1285, 1288-1289 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).

192

Id. at 1289.

193

Mozingo v. Scharf, 828 So. 2d 1246, 1250 (Miss. 2002) (citing Miller v. Meeks, 762
So. 2d 302 (Miss. 2000)).
194

Sullivan v. Washington, 768 So. 2d 881, 882 (Miss. 2000).

195

Theobald v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 827 N.E.2d 365, 377 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).

196

Id.
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Georgia
The physician's duty to the
patient is independent from his
official state duties and he is still
under a duty to treat the patient
with a reasonable degree of care
and skill,197 even to the extent
where a patient signs a form
acknowledging that the
procedure will take place at a
teaching hospital and that
students and observers will be
present for educational
purposes.198

99

Michigan
Jury determination is necessary
on whether the agency with the
state is dissolved through
service to a private master.199
Michigan maintains that an
employee could be deemed to
be acting for two masters
simultaneously.200

Virginia
“[I]mplicit in the employment by
the University of Virginia of
physicians to teach in its
Medical School and to attend
patients in its Hospital, is the
understanding that they will use
reasonable care in the
performance of their duties. A
failure to use such care in the
treatment of patients is a
violation of their duty to the
patients and a departure from a
condition of their
employment.”201
Alabama
The Supreme Court of Alabama
has stated that employees such
as doctors who use "medical
discretion" do not receive
immunity.202 Also, supervising
doctors have been held liable for
their acts and omissions in
supervising residents.203

197

Keenan v. Plouffe, 482 S.E.2d 253, 257 (Ga. 1997).

198

Id.

199

Vargo v. Sauer, 576 N.W.2d 656, 666 (Mich. 1998).

200

Id. at 665.

201

James v. Jane, 282 S.E.2d 864, 870 (Va. 1980).

202

Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 406 (Ala. 2000) (holding that doctors treating
students at a state university health center are not entitled to immunity).
203

Hauseman v. Univ. of Ala. Health Serv. Found., 793 So. 2d 730, 736 (Ala. 2000).
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Texas
Doctors using medical discretion
to treat patients are not entitled
to immunity.204 Additionally,
“supervising the medical
decision-making of lessexperienced doctors, along with
determining when to consult
more-experienced physicians,
are the exercise of medical
discretion.”205
Tennessee
A physician would receive
immunity if he does not act in a
private capacity, and students or
residents participate in the
treatment. However, if the
doctor privately bills a patient,
there is no immunity.206
Oklahoma
Whenever treating a patient, a
faculty physician is acting
outside the scope of his or her
employment with the state.207
Louisiana
Courts have held doctors may be
held personally liable in
negligent supervision of a
medical intern in treating
patients; thus, there is no
immunity.208 The court
separated the negligence of the
intern being supervised and the
negligence of the doctor in
supervision. Also, statute
requiring the state to bear the
cost of defending a “public
employee” will not prevent the
public employee from being
sued in his private capacity, nor
be accounted for there within.209

204

Mussemann v. Villarreal, 178 S.W.3d 319, 326 (Tex. App. 2005).

205

Id.

206

Hayden v. Waller, No. 02A01-9511-BC-00241, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 867, at *21
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
207

Nelson v. Pollay, 916 P.2d 1369, 1376 (Okla. 1996).

208

Landry v. Leonard J. Chabert Med. Ctr., 858 So. 2d 454, 464 (La. Ct. App. 2003).

209

Id. at 461.
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Colorado
Following the statute, whenever
a doctor supervises a resident-intraining, he is immune.210 The
statute also discusses educating
along with supervising, and no
cases explore this further. This
could very well mean mere
involvement, however, probably
not since it says “supervising
and educating;” so, supervising
would be required. Also, this
will most likely only apply for
supervising residents since the
statute explicitly names
“residents-in-training.”
Missouri
A doctor acts in a ministerial
function when treating a patient;
thus, he never gets immunity.211
By not exercising the sovereign's
power in treating patients, a
doctor acts the same as if he was
in private practice.212
Wisconsin
Medical discretion does not get
immunity; it is considered
“ministerial.”213 Only when the
conduct involves the
determination of fundamental
governmental policy and is
essential to the realization of that
policy is where the immunity is
applied.
Illinois
Every doctor owes his patient
the duty of ordinary care;
immunity will only be granted
for acts such as administrative or
legislative duties.214

210

Sereff v. Steedle, No. 03CA1445, 2005 Colo. App. LEXIS 1291, **8-10 (Colo. Ct.
App. 2005).
211

Jackson v. Wilson, 581 S.W.2d 39, 43 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).

212

Cooper v. Bowers, 706 S.W.2d 542, 543 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).

213

Gordon v. Milwaukee County, 370 N.W.2d 803, 806 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985); Protic v.
Castle Co., 392 N.W.2d 119, 122 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986), superseded by statute, WIS. STAT. §
893.82 (2006), as recognized in Daily v. Univ. of Wis., 429 N.W.2d 83 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988);
Walker v. Univ. of Wis. Hosp., 542 N.W.2d 207, 212-213 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
214

Jinkins v. Lee, 807 N.E.2d 411, 413 (Ill. 2004).
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North Carolina
A doctor sued for malpractice
does not receive immunity,
regardless of his employment
with the state.215
New Jersey
Courts have held that the statute
“immunizes only the publichealth activities of physicians
and expressly approves of
liability for treatment of
patients;” thus, doctors do not
receive immunity for treatment
of patients at anytime.216
Minnesota
Medical practitioners employed
by the state are not entitled to
official immunity.217

215
Urquhart v. Univ. Health Sys. of E. Carolina, Inc., 566 S.E.2d 143, 145 (N.C. Ct. App.
2002). This is further evidenced by the case of Jones v. Pitt County Memorial Hosp., Inc., 410
S.E.2d 513 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991). In the case, a suit was brought against the East Carolina
University School of Medical, eight doctors who were faculty members at the medical school
and on staff at the hospital, and seven residents-in-training. Id. at 514. The medical school
was the lone defendant to be dismissed on grounds of immunity. Id. at 513-14. This shows
that faculty members probably were not able to receive immunity in dual agency and possibly
even that residents-in-training do not receive immunity.
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Willis v. Ashby, 801 A.2d 442, 444 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).

217

Terwilliger v. Hennepin County, 561 N.W.2d 909, 913-14 (Minn. 1997).

